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The Interdependence Between
Homeland Security Efforts of a State
and a Terrorist’s Choice of Attack

April 8, 2011

Abstract: Consider a state that chooses security levels at two sites (Targets A and B),
after which a terrorist chooses which site to attack (and potentially a scope of attack).
The state values A more highly. If the state knows which target the terrorist values more
highly, he will choose a higher level of security at this site. Under complete information,
if the terrorist’s only choice is which site to attack, the state will set security levels for
which the terrorist prefers to attack A over B if and only if the ratio of the value of
B to the value of A is greater for the state than for the terrorist. When the state has
incomplete information on the terrorist’s target values, the optimal security levels may
be such that: a target is completely undefended (but attacked with positive probability);
the probability of attack is greater at A than at B; and the expected damage from an
attack is greater at A than at B. In total, the results reveal that the state’s choice of
security is heavily influenced by the terrorist’s target valuations.
Keywords: counterterrorism; defensive measures; homeland security; applied game
theory.

1. Introduction
There is strong evidence that terrorists are rational and respond to incentives. For example, if tougher
measures are taken against skyjackings or attacks on airports, terrorists may instead target trains; if
security at embassies is improved, terrorists may switch to kidnappings. Enders and Sandler (1993, 1995,
2004) and Sandler and Enders (2004) offer empirical support for terrorists’ rationality in the form of
observable responses to changes in constraints (e.g., substitution away from skyjackings to kidnappings
after airports installed metal detectors).1 Thus, expenditures on counterterrorism very often have the
effect of displacing terrorist attacks from one target to another (Economist, March 8, 2008, p. 69).
Our purpose is to analyze a government’s decision on how to allocate protective resources across
different targets within a single country. These alternative targets can be interpreted either as geographical venues (e.g., cities versus borders) or as different types of attacks (e.g., nuclear versus biological).2
In this respect, our approach differs from much of the existing literature on strategic counterterrorism,
which focuses on interactions between different target countries or between targets within the same
country that are treated as independent decisionmakers. Our interest in a centralized decisionmaker is
motivated in part by a growing concern among scholars and the media with the costs and inefficiencies
of counterterrorism policies. A high-profile critique of U.S. spending on the Iraq war3 by Stiglitz and
Bilmes (2008),4 puts the cost of the war at an exorbitant $3 trillion and argues that the U.S. government
adopted a shortsighted allocation of resources, economizing on the costs of equipment for the troops at
1

Enders, Sandler, and Cauley (1990) use time-series techniques to evaluate short-, medium- and long-run effects of spe-

cific terrorist-thwarting policies, such as metal detectors, enhanced security for U.S. embassies and personnel, and the U.S.
retaliatory strike against Libya in April 1986. Brandt and Sandler (2010) document empirically how the hardening of some
targets has led to more attacks on other targets, for example, as government and military targets have been defended more
successfully, terrorists have substituted toward increased attacks on businesses and private individuals.
2

See Bier, Oliveros, and Samuelson (2007, p. 564).
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While the Iraq war may not be considered a counterterrorism expenditure, a case can be made that, at least at its outset,

it was a component of the “war on terror.” See Lowenberg and Mathews (2008).
4

See also Bilmes and Stiglitz (2006).

1

the expense of higher casualties and medical care burdens in the future.5 A study by Sandler, Arce, and
Enders (2008) suggests that much of the spending on counterterrorism fails a simple cost-benefit test.
They estimate that global spending on homeland security has risen by $65 billion to $200 billion per
year since 2001. In their calculation, the aggressive increase in counterterrorism spending in 2002-03
following the 9/11 attacks produced only five to eight cents of benefits per dollar spent.6 Thus, it is useful to closely examine how a target country should allocate counterterrorism resources, especially since
terrorists’ behavior can be influenced by the defensive actions of a target state.
Sandler and Arce (2007) provide an excellent survey of the vast literature on game theoretic analyses
of terrorism and counterterrorism policies. More recent developments in the literature are discussed by
Sandler and Siqueira (2009). As these authors note, the fundamental nature of the interaction between
terrorists and their targets is strategic, often due to the presence of many uncompensated interdependencies in the form of public good and externality effects. An example, noted early in the history of
such studies, is that, in a three-player game consisting of two potential target governments and a terrorist group, defensive policies initiated independently by one target government create negative spillover
effects for other targets, by deflecting terrorist attacks to the relatively “soft” target (Sandler and Lapan,
1988; Sandler and Siqueira, 2006). That is, defensive policies are strategic complements: one target’s
defensive policies potentially deflect attacks to the other target, requiring the latter to respond with its
own defensive measures. When defensive resources are chosen by two independent decisionmakers, the
result is a costly and Pareto inferior deterrence race among target countries. Such a game is effectively
an open-access commons problem, or congestion externality,7 in which the socially efficient outcome is
mutual inaction whereas the dominant strategy is to take action.8
However, this effect of “increasing defensive efforts at one target makes other targets more desirable”
5

Economist, March 15, 2008, p. 98. Other analysts, however, have accused Stiglitz and Bilmes of overstating some costs.
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See Economist, March 8, 2008, p. 69.
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See Keohane and Zeckhauser (2003).
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Cadigan and Schmitt (2010) verify, using laboratory experiments, the finding that negative externalities produce overin-

vestment in deterrence expenditures.
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is present even when levels of protective resources are chosen by a single decisionmaker. Consider a state
setting security levels at two sites, Target A and Target B. When assessing the terrorists’ desirability for
attacking A, the state need not be worried about “external costs” stemming from the fact that A becomes
a relatively more desirable target when B is more heavily defended, not because the costs are absent
but rather because the costs are not external. That is, when choosing defensive efforts at each site, it is
critical for the state to be cognizant of and carefully account for such cross target effects. In the present
paper, we analyze the decision of a single government regarding levels of protection at alternative targets.
We conclude this section by summarizing the recent work most closely related to the present study.
Powell (2007) analyzes a government’s allocation of a fixed amount of defensive resources across
multiple domestic target venues, under the assumption that the government is uninformed about the terrorists’ preferences regarding choice of target. When making its choice, the government must account
for: the loss incurred as a result of a successful attack on a given venue; the vulnerability of the venue
(i.e., the probability an attack will succeed); and the probability of an attack occurring, which is determined by the terrorists’ choice of target. Powell focuses on an environment in which a target becomes
less attractive to the terrorists when it is more heavily defended.9 Under this assumption, Powell clearly
explains how increasing defensive resources at a venue has competing effects: the marginal expected loss
to the government at the first venue declines, while that at the alternative venue increases. He extends
his model to the N-target case, using a minimax algorithm to solve the game in order to illustrate how
the government would optimally allocate defensive resources.
The two papers most closely related to the present study are Bier, Oliveros, and Samuelson (2007)
and Zhuang and Bier (2007). In contrast to Powell (2007), in each of these studies the total amount of
resources available to the defender is endogenously determined. Further, in Zhuang and Bier (2007) the
9

This is a simplifying assumption, which is not always satisfied in practice. For example, terrorists could be motivated by

the prestige of successfully attacking a heavily guarded site, in which case increasing defensive resources could make a target
more attractive to terrorists. Such considerations are beyond the scope of both Powell (2007) and the present study.
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terrorists get to choose both the location and scope of their attack (i.e., the amount of resources devoted
to the attack), but these authors examine only an environment of complete information, in which both
players know the true values of all relevant parameters. In contrast, Bier, Oliveros, and Samuelson (2007)
consider an environment in which there is incomplete information regarding the value that the attacker
places on each target, but they do not allow the attacker to have a choice regarding the scope of attack. In
further contrast to Powell (2007), each of these studies provides some discussion of instances in which
staging an attack is costly for the terrorists (so that an attack is not always staged with certainty).
Several interesting results are derived from these models. First, it is shown that the terrorists’ attack efforts and the state’s defensive investments may be strategic complements (i.e., increased defense
expenditures by the government may lead to increased attack efforts by the terrorists and vice versa).
In such cases, increased levels of activity by either party may ultimately be mutually welfare reducing.
These authors also demonstrate that the state has a strategic interest in moving first, thereby inducing
the terrorists to attack more vulnerable but less valuable targets. Due to this first-mover advantage, the
government may prefer its defense allocations to be observable, as opposed to unobservable.10 These
models (as well as those of Farrow (2007) and Lee (2007)) also illustrate that a venue may be left undefended in equilibrium, even if it is subject to a positive probability of attack, if the expected losses to the
government from an attack are low relative to the opportunity cost of enhanced defenses.
In the present study we focus on the choice of defensive resources across two targets by a centralized
decisionmaker. As in Bier, Oliveros, and Samuelson (2007) and Zhuang and Bier (2007), the total
amount of defensive resources is endogenously determined. Further, we generally allow for incomplete
information regarding the terrorist’s “type” and allow the terrorist to choose both a target and scope of
10

However, Zhuang and Bier (2011) and Zhuang, Bier, and Alagoz (2010), allowing for two-sided uncertainty in which

neither player knows the other’s capabilities or efforts, show that secrecy by the government may be optimal as a consequence
of the endogenous response of the terrorists. Bernhardt and Polborn (2010) argue that, due to non-convexities in defense
strategies, a government that attaches similar values to alternative targets might benefit from concealing its defense allocations
from the terrorists.
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attack, assumptions which when made together differentiate this study from the existing literature.11
In Section 2 a theoretical model is specified and preliminary insights on the behavior of both the
terrorist and state are obtained. It is shown that if the terrorist is certain to value a specific target more
highly, then the state will allocate a greater amount of security resources to this target (even if this is not
the target that the state values more highly). A closer examination of situations of complete information
is provided in Section 3. Within this discussion, it is shown how the preference of the state regarding
where an attack is ultimately staged in such a setting depends critically upon the ratio of target valuations
for both the state and terrorist. Further, it is noted how it may be best for the state to leave a target undefended and may be best for the state to choose security levels sufficiently high so that no attack is staged.
Additional insights on situations of incomplete information are provided in Section 4. It is noted how it
may be best for the state to leave a target completely undefended, even if it will be attacked with positive
probability (an insight obtained in previous studies). Further, we compare the equilibrium “probability
of attack” and “expected damage” across targets (comparisons not made in previous studies) to illustrate
that it may be best for the state to choose security levels: for which an attack is more likely to be staged
on the target that is more highly valued by the state; and for which the expected damage from a terrorist
attack is greater at the target which is more highly valued by the state. In total, our results reveal the
strong degree to which the state’s choice of security is driven by the target valuations of the terrorist.
Section 5 concludes.

2. Theoretical Model
Consider a terrorist organization (denoted T ) looking to stage an attack within the homeland of a state
11

Additionally, several minor modeling assumptions differ from previous studies. For example, when modeling the choice

of security, Bier, Oliveros, and Samuelson (2007) allow the state to have a direct choice of the “success probability for the
terrorists’ attack” while incurring security costs that are non-linear in this probability. In contrast, we assume security costs
are a linear function while the terrorists’ success probability is a non-linear function of the government’s security level.
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(denoted S).12 Suppose T will attack at most one of two targets (denoted Target A and Target B). Let
VSi > 0 denote the value that S places on Target i, for i ∈ {A, B}. Likewise, let VT i denote the value that
T places on Target i, for i ∈ {A, B}. We assume throughout that the values of VSA and VSB are known by
both players, but we allow for incomplete information regarding the true values of VT A and VT B .13 The
true pair of (VT A , VT B ) identifies the type of T . Let VT denote the set of possible types of T , and suppose
(VT A , VT B ) ∈ VT is determined as the realization of a single draw from the joint distribution function
GT (vT A , vT B ). Assume VT is a convex set, with GT (vT A , vT B ) placing strictly positive probability on
all points in VT . By incomplete information, we mean that while T knows the true values of (VT A , VT B ),
S does not know these exact values but rather knows only the distribution function GT (vT A , vT B ) from
which the type of T is determined.
Before T chooses which target to attack, S sets levels of homeland security at each site (hi ≥ 0
denotes the level at Target i). After observing the security levels, T chooses which target to attack (with
no attack being an option) along with the scope of attack (ri ≥ 0 denotes the amount of resources devoted
to attacking Target i). The expected damage from an attack on Target i, of scope ri , defended at hi is
D (hi , ri ), meaning that such an attack leads to an expected loss of VSi D (hi , ri ) for S and an expected
gain of VT i D (hi , ri ) for T .
Assume that the function D (h, r) : [0, ∞) × [0, ∞) → [0, 1] satisfies the following properties:
∂D(h,r)
∂h

< 0 and

∂ 2 D(h,r)
∂h2

> 0 for all r > 0 (increasing homeland security decreases the damage from

an attack, but does so with diminishing returns); either

∂D(h,r)
∂r

> 0 and

∂ 2 D(h,r)
∂r2

< 0 for all h > 0

(increasing the scope of the attack increases the damage from the attack, but does so at a decreasing rate)
or

∂D(h,r)
∂r

= 0 for all h > 0 (the damage from the attack does not depend at all upon the scope of the

attack, so that in practice T is simply choosing where to attack); D(0, r) = 1 for all r ≥ 0 (an attack on
an undefended target imposes the full loss of VSi on S and gives T the full gain of VT i , even an attack of
12

A summary of all notations is provided in Table 1.

13

As will be discussed below, because of the way in which the timing of the decisions is modeled, the analysis and results

would not differ if we additionally allowed there to be incomplete information with respect to the values of VSA and VSB .
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zero scope); and D(h, r) → 0 as h → ∞ for all r ≥ 0.
Suppose S incurs a constant marginal cost of CS > 0 from increasing homeland security at either
target, so that choosing (hA , hB ) costs [hA +hB ]CS . These costs are incurred regardless of T ’s subsequent
choice. Thus, S has a payoff of: πSA (hA , hB , rA ) = −D (hA , rA ) VSA − [hA + hB ]CS if A is attacked
with scope rA ; πSB (hA , hB , rB ) = −D (hB , rB ) VSB − [hA + hB ]CS if B is attacked with scope rB ; and
πS∅ (hA , hB ) = −[hA + hB ]CS if no attack is staged.
Suppose T incurs fixed costs of FT from staging an attack, a value which depends upon neither
which target is attacked nor the level of security at the targeted site.14 Additionally, T incurs a marginal
cost of CT > 0 when increasing the scope of an attack at either target. Thus, T realizes a payoff of: πT A (hA , rA ) = D (hA , rA ) VT A − rA CT − FT from attacking A with rA ; πT B (hB , rB ) =
D (hB , rB ) VT B − rB CT − FT from attacking B with rB ; and πT ∅ = 0 from staging no attack.
We focus on a single period, sequential decision making environment, in which S first chooses
(hA , hB ). After S makes this observable choice, T then chooses to attack A, B, or neither target (and, if
staging an attack, chooses the scope of the attack). We generally consider an environment of incomplete
information in which S chooses (hA , hB ) without knowing the actual values of (VT A , VT B ) but rather
knowing only the distribution function, GT (vT A , vT B ), from which the type of T is drawn.15
The game is analyzed via backward induction.16 When S chooses (hA , hB ), he does so without
knowing the actual (VT A , VT B ) but with the correct recognition that the subsequent behavior of T depends critically on the chosen (hA , hB ) and actual values of (VT A , VT B ). Thus, S bases his choice on a
computation of his expected payoff, supposing T will behave rationally (given his actual type) and with
14

These fixed costs can be entirely avoided by staging no attack. Note, the assumption that T attacks at most one target can

be justified by assuming that either: the fixed costs of staging a second attack are so large, that doing so is never desirable; or
the marginal benefit to T of attacking and damaging a second target is so small, that doing so is never desirable.
15

Complete information can be thought of as a special case, in which VT consists of a single pair of values (VT A , VT B ).

16

We technically have a sequential game of incomplete information (with observable actions). The appropriate equilibrium

concept is Perfect Bayesian Equilibrium. For brevity, we refer to simply the equilibrium throughout the discussion.
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an appropriate weight assigned to each possible realization of type for T (according to the distribution
GT (vT A , vT B )). Let h∗A and h∗B denote the equilibrium levels of homeland security for S. We aim to gain
insight into how h∗A and h∗B relate to each other and depend upon the parameters of the model. When
doing so, it is necessary to understand how this choice by S impacts the choice of target and scope by T .
2.1. Initial Insights on the Choice of Target/Scope by T
Focusing on the choice by T in the terminal node of the game, we can think of T first determining the
ideal scope for attacking each possible target.17 Let ri∗ (hi ) denote the optimal scope of attack on Target
i, and let πT∗ i (hi ) = πT i (hi , ri∗ (hi )) denote the resulting payoff of T from staging such an attack. Recall,
πT i (hi , ri ) = D(hi , ri )VT i − ri CT − FT . It follows that when
solution) satisfy the first order condition

∂D(hi ,ri )
VT i
∂ri

∂D(h,r)
∂r

= CT . If instead

> 0, ri∗ (hi ) must (at an interior

∂D(h,r)
∂r

= 0 for all r ≥ 0, then the

optimal choice of scope by T is simply the corner solution of ri∗ = 0.
∗
∗
After identifying rA
(hA ) and rB
(hB ) and determining πT∗ A (hA ) and πT∗ B (hB ), T will: attack A
∗
∗
(hB ) if πT∗ B (hB ) ≥
(hA ) if πT∗ A (hA ) ≥ max {πT∗ B (hB ) , 0}; attack B with scope rB
with scope rA

max {πT∗ A (hA ) , 0}; and stage no attack if max {πT∗ A (hA ) , πT∗ B (hB )} ≤ 0.18 It is instructive to see how
πT∗ i (hi ) = D(hi , ri∗ (hi ))VT i − ri∗ (hi )CT − FT depends upon both hi and VT i . Lemma 1 addresses the
first of these issues.
Lemma 1. πT∗ i (hi ) = D(hi , ri∗ (hi ))VT i − ri∗ (hi )CT − FT is decreasing in hi .
Proof. Consider an arbitrary hi = h̃, for which r̃ = ri∗ (h̃) and πT∗ i (h̃) = D(h̃, r̃)VT i − r̃CT − FT .
17

Returning attention to the impact of the informational structure on the behavior of the players, recognize that: the payoff

of T does not directly depend upon VSA and VSB ; T is only called upon to act once, in the terminal node of the game; and
T is able to observe (hA , hB ) before deciding how to act. Thus, the behavior of T could never depend upon the beliefs
that T holds regarding the values of VSA and VSB , implying that the analysis would proceed in an identical manner if we
additionally allowed there to be incomplete information regarding the type of S.
18

If any of these conditions hold with equality, then T has two or more options that yield his maximal payoff. In such

instances, T is indifferent with respect to choosing among these best options.
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Suppose that S had instead chosen hi = ĥ with ĥ < h̃. Since

∂D(h,r)
∂h

< 0, the fact that ĥ < h̃ implies

D(ĥ, r̃) > D(h̃, r̃). Thus, even if T were to still choose r̃ when S chooses ĥ, T would realize a larger
payoff: πT i (ĥ, r̃) = D(ĥ, r̃)VT i − r̃CT − FT > πT∗ i (h̃). Since r̃ need not be optimal when hi = ĥ, T ’s
payoff must be even greater for r̂ = ri∗ (ĥ). Thus, πT∗ i (ĥ) ≥ πT i (ĥ, r̃) > πT∗ i (h̃). 
Lemma 1 implies that when S increases the level of security at a target, attacking the target becomes
less desirable to T (even after accounting for the fact that T could alter his scope of attack). Inspection
of πT i (hi , ri ) = D(hi , ri )VT i − ri CT − FT provides the intuition for Lemma 1. Since

∂D(h,r)
∂h

< 0,

increasing hi decreases the value of πT i (hi , ri ) at each ri . Thus, the maximum value of πT i (hi , ri ) (when
maximized with respect to ri ) must be smaller when a larger value of hi is chosen. Further, increasing hi
has no direct impact on the payoff of T from attacking the alternative target.
Let h̄i denote the smallest value of hi for which πT∗ i (hi ) ≤ 0.19 If S chooses hi ≥ h̄i , then T prefers
to stage no attack over attacking Target i. Thus: if hA ≥ h̄A and hB ≥ h̄B , then T will not stage an
attack; if hA < h̄A and hB ≥ h̄B , then T will attack A; and if hA ≥ h̄A and hB < h̄B , then T will
attack B. Further, if hA < h̄A and hB < h̄B , then attacking either target yields a positive payoff for T , in
which case the choice of target is based upon a comparison of πT∗ A (hA ) to πT∗ B (hB ). That is, T prefers
to attack A over B if and only if πT∗ A (hA ) ≥ πT∗ B (hB ), or equivalently
∗
∗
∗
∗
D(hA , rA
(hA ))VT A − rA
(hA )CT ≥ D(hB , rB
(hB ))VT B − rB
(hB )CT .

(1)

The combinations of (hA , hB ) for which the condition in (1) holds with equality define a “locus of
indifference in (hA , hB )-space” for T with respect to attacking A versus attacking B.20 For hB ∈ [0, h̄B ),
let hLA (hB ) denote the hA for which (1) holds with equality. For each hB ∈ [0, h̄B ), T will attack A
if hA < hLA (hB ) and will attack B if hA > hLA (hB ). This target choice (dependent upon (hA , hB ),
19

Assuming D(h, r) → 0 as h → ∞ for all r ≥ 0 guarantees that πT∗ i (hi ) becomes negative for arbitrarily large hi .

20

Since the expression on the left side of (1) is decreasing in hA and does not depend upon hB while the expression on

the right side of (1) is decreasing in hB and does not depend upon hA , it follows that this locus must be upward sloping.
Additionally, this locus must pass through (hA , hB ) = (h̄A , h̄B ), since πT∗ A (h̄A ) = πT∗ B (h̄B ) = 0.
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accounting for the actual values of (VT A , VT B )) is illustrated in Figure 1. Inspection of Figure 1 reveals
the following intuitive points – other factors fixed, T will: attack A when the hA is relatively small;
attack B when hB is relatively small; and attack neither target when hA and hB are both relatively large.
We now address the preference of target for T when hA = hB = h, which allows us to determine
whether this locus in (hA , hB )-space lies above or below the 45◦ -line. Lemma 2 provides such a characterization, dependent upon the relation of αT =
Lemma 2. If αT =

VT B
VT A

VT B
VT A

to a value of one.

= 1, then πT∗ A (h) = πT∗ B (h) for all h > 0. If αT =

πT∗ A (h) > πT∗ B (h) for all h > 0. If αT =

VT B
VT A

VT B
VT A

< 1, then

> 1, then πT∗ A (h) < πT∗ B (h) for all h > 0.

Proof. Regardless of the magnitude of αT =

VT B
,
VT A

the desired insight depends upon a comparison of

πT∗ A (h) to πT∗ B (h) (i.e., essentially the comparison made by condition (1) evaluated at hA = hB = h).
∗
∗
(h) (recall, when
(h) = rB
First consider αT = 1 (i.e., VT A = VT B ). When VT A = VT B , rA

0 the optimal choice of scope must satisfy

∂D(h,ri )
∂ri

=

CT
)
VT i

∂D(h,r)
∂r

>

∗
∗
and D(h, rA
(h)) = D(h, rB
(h)). Thus,

∗
∗
∗
∗
(h)CT − FT .
(h))VT B − rB
(h)CT − FT is equal to πT∗ B (h) = D(h, rB
(h))VT A − rA
πT∗ A (h) = D(h, rA
∗
∗
(h)).
(h)) to πT A (h, rB
Next consider αT < 1 (i.e., VT A > VT B ). Compare πT∗ B (h) = πT B (h, rB
∗
This latter expression is the payoff to T from attacking A with scope rB
(h) (the optimal scope for
∗
∗
∗
∗
(h))VT A − rB
(h)CT >
(h)) if and only if D(h, rB
attacking B). Note, πT A (h, rB
(h)) > πT B (h, rB
∗
∗
(h)CT or equivalently if and only if VT A > VT B (which is the condition defining
(h))VT B − rB
D(h, rB
∗
∗
this case). Since πT∗ A (h) = πT A (h, rA
(h)) must be greater than πT A (h, rB
(h)) (by the optimality of
∗
rA
(h)), it follows that πT∗ A (h) > πT∗ B (h). The proof of the third portion of the lemma proceeds along

identical lines and is omitted for brevity. 
By Lemma 2, if S defends the targets equally, T prefers to attack the target which T values more.
For example, when VT A > VT B (i.e., αT < 1), the locus lies strictly below the 45◦ -line (as illustrated in
Figure 1). Thus, for hA = hB = h, T realizes a greater payoff from attacking A than from attacking B.
Since the choice of (hA , hB ) is generally made by S in an environment of incomplete information, it
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is instructive to recognize how (for chosen levels of hA and hB ) the choice of target by T depends upon
the realized VT A and VT B . Toward this end, recognize that (as stated by Lemma 3) for arbitrary levels of
security, πT∗ i (hi ) = D(hi , ri∗ (hi ))VT i − ri∗ (hi )CT − FT is increasing in VT i .
Lemma 3. πT∗ i (hi ) = D(hi , ri∗ (hi ))VT i − ri∗ (hi )CT − FT is increasing in VT i .
Proof. To recognize why this lemma is not self evident, recall that generally ri∗ (hi ) (and thus
D(hi , ri∗ )) depends upon VT i . Fixing hi , let ṼT i denote an arbitrary realized value of VT i , for which
r̃i∗ is the corresponding optimal scope when attacking Target i. This realization of ṼT i and choice of r̃i∗
lead to π̃T∗ i (hi ) = πT i (hi , r̃i∗ (hi )). Suppose that V̂T i had been realized, with V̂T i > ṼT i . Let r̂i∗ denote the
optimal scope of attack when V̂T i is realized, for which π̂T∗ i (hi ) = πT i (hi , r̂i∗ (hi )) results.
By comparison, D(hi , r̃i∗ (hi ))V̂T i −r̃i∗ (hi )CT −FT is greater than D(hi , r̃i∗ (hi ))ṼT i −r̃i∗ (hi )CT −FT =
π̃T∗ i (hi ) (i.e., the payoff of T is larger for the larger VT i , without altering the scope of attack). Since r̂i∗
is the optimal scope when V̂T i is realized, it follows that π̂T∗ i (hi ) = D(hi , r̂i∗ (hi ))V̂T i − r̂i∗ (hi )CT − FT
must be even greater than D(hi , r̃i∗ (hi ))V̂T i − r̃i∗ (hi )CT − FT , implying π̂T∗ i (hi ) > π̃T∗ i (hi ). 
Lemma 3 states that for any arbitrarily fixed value of hi , the payoff for T from staging an attack of
optimal scope on Target i is increasing in the realized value of VT i . Further note that a larger realization
of VT i does not impact the payoff to T from attacking the alternate site whatsoever. Finally, recall that
staging no attack and realizing a payoff of πT ∅ = 0 is always an option.
These observations imply that for any chosen (hA , hB ) there exists a cutoff V̄T A (hA ) such that
πT∗ A (hA ) ≥ πT ∅ = 0 if and only if VT A ≥ V̄T A (hA ) and a cutoff V̄T B (hB ) such that πT∗ B (hB ) ≥
πT ∅ = 0 if and only if VT B ≥ V̄T B (hB ). Thus, T will only ever stage no attack if his true valuations are VT A < V̄T A (hA ) and VT B < V̄T B (hB ). If either VT A ≥ V̄T A (hA ) or VT B ≥ V̄T B (hB ),
then T will stage an attack. If both VT A ≥ V̄T A (hA ) and VT B ≥ V̄T B (hB ), then attacking either
target gives T a positive payoff, in which case T bases the choice of target upon a comparison of
∗
∗
∗
∗
πT∗ A (hA ) = D(hA , rA
(hA ))VT A −rA
(hA )CT −FT to πT∗ B (hB ) = D(hB , rB
(hB ))VT B −rB
(hB )CT −FT .
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Recognizing that this comparison is identical to that described by (1), we can construct a “locus of
indifference in (VT A , VT B )-space” consisting of (VT A , VT B ) ∈ [V̄T A (hA ), ∞) × [V̄T B (hB ), ∞) for which
T is indifferent between attacking A versus B.21 Let VTLB (VT A , hA , hB ) specify the value of VT B along
this locus as a function of the chosen security levels and realized VT A . For an arbitrary VT A ≥ V̄T A (hA ),
T will attack A if VT B < VTLB (VT A , hA , hB ) and will attack B if VT B > VTLB (VT A , hA , hB ). Figure 2
illustrates how (for chosen values of (hA , hB )) the choice of target depends upon the realized (VT A , VT B ).
For (VT A , VT B ): in Area A2, T will attack A; in Area B2, T will attack B; and in Area N 2, T will not
stage an attack. Inspection of Figure 2 reveals the following intuitive points – other factors fixed, T will:
attack A when VT A is relatively large; attack B when VT B is relatively large; and attack neither target
when VT A and VT B are both relatively small.
2.2. Initial Insights on the Choice of Homeland Security Levels by S
To see how changes in hA or hB alter the choice of target by T , we need to determine how such changes
impact the boundaries in Figure 2. Consider an increase in hA from ĥA to h̃A with hB fixed.22 Increasing
hA decreases πT∗ A (hA ) for any value of VT A (Lemma 1). Since V̄T A (ĥA ) denotes the value of VT A for
which πT∗ A (ĥA ) = 0, it follows that attacking A would yield a negative payoff for T if VT A = V̄T A (ĥA )
and hA = h̃A . Since πT∗ A (hA ) is increasing in VT A (Lemma 3), in the face of h̃A a larger value of VT A is
required to realize πT∗ A (h̃A ) = 0. Thus, V̄T A (hA ) is increasing in hA .
Continue to consider an increase in hA from ĥA to h̃A with hB fixed, but now focus on the locus
of indifference between attacking A versus B (defined by πT∗ A (hA ) = πT∗ B (hB )). An increase in hA
decreases πT∗ A (hA ) (Lemma 1) but has no impact on πT∗ B (hB ). For combinations of (VT A , VT B ) along
the initial locus, when facing hA = h̃A instead of hA = ĥA the payoff of T is now greater from attacking
B as opposed to A. Since πT∗ A (hA ) is increasing in VT A (Lemma 3), in the face of h̃A a larger value of
VT A is needed to realize πT∗ A (h̃A ) = πT∗ B (hB ). Thus, VTLB (VT A , hA , hB ) must be decreasing in hA .
21

Lemma 3 implies that this locus must be upward sloping in (VT A , VT B )-space.

22

Because of the symmetric nature of the problem, similar insights would follow for an increase in hB with hA fixed.
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Linking this discussion to Figure 2 reveals the two ways that increasing hA alters the target choice of
T . As hA is increased, V̄T A (hA ) increases (i.e., the boundary between Area A2 and Area N 2 moves to the
right) and VTLB (VT A , ĥA , hB ) decreases (i.e., the boundary between Area A2 and Area B2 moves down
or equivalently to the right). For chosen (hA , hB ), T will attack A with probability PA (hA , hB ), attack B
with probability PB (hA , hB ), and stage no attack with probability P∅ (hA , hB ) (with each probability determined by integrating over all (VT A , VT B ) in the relevant area of Figure 2, according to GT (vT A , vT B )).
Starting at (hA , hB ) for which (V̄T A (hA ), V̄T B (hB )) ∈ VT , each area in Figure 2 would have a nonempty intersection with VT , so each probability would be strictly positive. As hA is increased, there are
some (VT A , VT B ) ∈ VT for which T would have initially attacked A but for which he now attacks B
and there are some (VT A , VT B ) ∈ VT for which T would have initially attacked A but for which he now
stages no attack.23 Thus, increasing hA has not only the two desired effects of decreasing PA (hA , hB )
and increasing P∅ (hA , hB ), but also the undesired effect of increasing PB (hA , hB ).
If we instead started at (hA , hB ) for which (V̄T A (hA ), V̄T B (hB )) ∈
/ VT , then one or more of the
probabilities may initially equal zero, and further, an increase in hA might not alter the probabilities. For
example, suppose that for an initial (hA , hB ) the set VT lies strictly within the interior of Area A2 in
Figure 2, so that PA (hA , hB ) = 1 and P∅ (hA , hB ) = PB (hA , hB ) = 0. For a sufficiently small increase
in hA the entire set VT will still lie strictly within Area A2, so that we still have PA (hA , hB ) = 1 and
P∅ (hA , hB ) = PB (hA , hB ) = 0. Over this range, increasing hA does not alter the choice of target by T
at all, and only has the impact of decreasing the expected damage when A is ultimately attacked.
Recall, if both sites are equally defended, then T prefers to attack the target which he values more
highly (Lemma 2). In terms of Figure 2, this implies that for hA = hB = h, the locus of indifference in (VT A , VT B )-space is simply a 45◦ -line. Further: if hA > hB , then V̄T A (hA ) > V̄T B (hB ) and
VTLB (VT A , hA , hB ) < VT A (i.e., the locus lies below the 45◦ -line); and if hA < hB , then V̄T A (hA ) <
23

This relies on the assumption that VT is a convex set, with GT (vT A , vT B ) placing strictly positive probability on all

points in VT .
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V̄T B (hB ) and VTLB (VT A , hA , hB ) > VT A (i.e., the locus lies above the 45◦ -line). Finally, the situation in
which S leaves both targets undefended (i.e., hA = hB = 0) is simply a special case of hA = hB = h.
Under the assumption that D(0, r) = 1 for all r ≥ 0, following a choice of hi = 0 by S, if T were to
attack Target i he would do so by choosing ri = 0, resulting in D(0, 0) = 1 and πT∗ i (0) = VT i − FT . This
implies V̄T i (0) = FT . That is, attacking Target i defended at hi = 0 is better than staging no attack, so
long as T ’s value for Target i is simply above the fixed cost of staging an attack.
Proposition 1 provides insight on (h∗A , h∗B ) for two special cases with respect to VT .
Proposition 1. If VT A ≥ VT B (i.e., αT ≤ 1) for all (VT A , VT B ) ∈ VT , then h∗A ≥ h∗B . If VT A ≤ VT B
(i.e., αT ≥ 1) for all (VT A , VT B ) ∈ VT , then h∗A ≤ h∗B .
Proof. Suppose VT A ≥ VT B for all (VT A , VT B ) ∈ VT (i.e., VT consists of points on or below the
45◦ -line in (VT A , VT B )-space). If S chooses hB > hA , then the boundary between Areas A2 and B2 in
Figure 2 lies above the 45◦ -line. Thus, PB (hA , hB ) = 0. From here, S could decrease hB to hA + ε
without altering the choice of target or scope by T for any (VT A , VT B ) ∈ VT . However, this decrease in
hB directly decreases security costs for S (recall, costs of [hA + hB ]CS are incurred by S regardless of
the subsequent choice by T ) and thereby directly increases the payoff of S. Since this is true starting at
any hB > hA , it follows that h∗B ≤ h∗A . A similar argument proves the second part of the Proposition. 
By Proposition 1, whenever S knows which target is more highly valued by T , S will choose a
(weakly) higher level of security at the target which T values more highly. This begins to reveal the
strong degree to which S’s optimal choice depends upon the target valuations of T . This should not be
entirely surprising, since in any one-shot, sequential move game, the initial choice of Player 1 depends
greatly on the subsequent behavior of Player 2 (behavior which is based on the payoffs of Player 2).
The results of Proposition 1 are driven by the fact that S will only ever devote security resources to
a target if there is a benefit from doing so. Increasing hi can have the potential benefits of decreasing
the expected damage if Target i is attacked and decreasing the probability that Target i is attacked. For
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example, consider increasing hA , starting at a situation in which initially the entire set VT is in Area B2
in Figure 2. Since PA = 0 to start, there is no benefit from increasing hA : since A is never attacked,
decreasing the expected damage if A is attacked has no benefit; and since the probability of A being
attacked is zero, there is no benefit of decreasing the probability with which A is attacked.

3. Complete Information
Suppose S knows the exact values of VT A and VT B before choosing (hA , hB ). Recall that such an instance
of complete information corresponds to a situation in which the entire set VT consists of a single point
(VT A , VT B ), which is clearly covered by Proposition 1. Thus, for the case of complete information: if
VT A > VT B , then h∗A ≥ h∗B ; and if VT B > VT A , then h∗B ≥ h∗A . When attempting to further analyze S’s
choice in this setting, it is best to examine Figure 1. When S knows the values of (VT A , VT B ), S is in the
position of choosing which target is ultimately attacked (since S can infer with certainty where an attack
will be staged for any (hA , hB )).
If S chooses (hA , hB ) along the locus of indifference, then (by construction) T is indifferent between
attacking A versus B. However, following such a choice of security levels, S may have a strict preference
regarding which target is attacked. In order to ease the analysis, assume that following a choice of
(hA , hB ) along this locus, T chooses to attack the target which S prefers to be attacked.24
From Figure 1, we see that in the case of complete information (h∗A , h∗B ) must be at one of the
boundaries of the identified regions. For example, Area N 1 depicts the (hA , hB ) for which T attacks
neither target. But since increased homeland security is costly for S, a choice of (h̄A , h̄B ) gives S a
greater payoff than any other (hA , hB ) in Area N 1. Similarly, any (hA , hB ) strictly within the interior of
Area B1 cannot be best, since S could increase his payoff by decreasing hA ; any (hA , hB ) strictly within
24

If this were not assumed, then S would have to choose a slightly different level of security at one of the sites to give T a

strict preference for attacking the site that gives S the larger payoff. By the continuity of the payoff functions the payoff of
each player would be essentially equal to what results by assuming that when indifferent T stages the attack where S desires.

15

the interior of Area A1 cannot be best, since S could increase his payoff by decreasing hB . The search
for (h∗A , h∗B ) is significantly narrowed by these insights. When VT A > VT B (as illustrated in Figure 1),
the optimal (hA , hB ) must be either: along the horizontal axis between the origin and the point (hLA (0), 0)
(resulting in an attack on A); on the “locus of indifference in (hA , hB )-space” (leading to an attack on
the target which is preferred by S); or (h̄A , h̄B ) (resulting in no attack).25 From here the choice by S can
be analyzed as a choice of hA ∈ [0, h̄A ], under the constraint of hB being determined as just described.
Consider gradual increases in hA from hA = 0 up to hA = h̄A . As hA is increased between
hA = 0 and hA = hLA (0) (with hB = 0) an attack is ultimately staged on A and S realizes πS =
∗
−D(hA , rA
(hA ))VSA − hA CS . The only benefit of increasing hA over this range is decreasing the ex-

pected damage from an attack on A, while the marginal cost of increasing hA is simply CS . Let hlow
A
denote the level of hA ∈ [0, hLA (0)) which maximizes πS , and let πSlow denote the resulting payoff of S.


∗
∗
For hA ∈ [hLA (0), h̄A ), πS = − min D (hA , rA
(hA )) VSA , D hLB (hA ), rB
(hLB (hA )) VSB − [hA +
hLB (hA )]CS (where the first term reflects the assumption that the attack is staged on the target yielding
the greater payoff for S). As hA is increased from below hLA (0) to above hLA (0) the costs (and potentially
the benefits) to S change. First, the effective marginal cost of increasing hA becomes larger when
hA > hLA (0), because now S must choose hB = hLB (hA ) (i.e., a positive and increasingly larger level
of hB ) to remain on the locus as hA is increased. Further, increasing hA from below hLA (0) to above
hLA (0) induces T to attack B as opposed to A if and only if an attack on B leads to a larger payoff for
S than does an attack on A. As a result, if S prefers that the attack be staged on B for combinations
of (hA , hB ) along the locus, then πS is characterized by a discrete increase in value at hA = hLA (0) (if
instead S prefers that the attack be staged on A for combinations of (hA , hB ) along the locus, then πS
does not have such a discontinuity at hA = hLA (0), but rather has only a change in the value of its slope,
25

For VT A < VT B , the locus in Figure 1 lies above the 45◦ -line (and has a positive vertical intercept of hL
B (0)). In such

cases, (h∗A , h∗B ) would be either: along the vertical axis between the origin and (0, hL
B (0)); on the locus of indifference; or
(h̄A , h̄B ).
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reflecting the effective increase in marginal cost above this level of hA ). Let hmid
denote the level of
A
hA ∈ [hLA (0), h̄A ) which maximizes πS , and let πSmid denote the resulting payoff of S.
When analyzing S’s choice under complete information, it is critical to determine the preference of
S over whether an attack is staged on A versus B for points along the locus in Figure 1. Condition (1),
which defines this locus, can be expressed as:
∗
∗
∗
VT B CT [rA
(hA ) − rB
(hB )]
D(hA , rA
(hA ))
=
+
.
∗
∗
D(hB , rB (hB ))
VT A
VT A D(hB , rB (hB ))

(2)

∗
∗
For chosen (hA , hB ), we have πSA > πSB if and only if D(hB , rB
(hB ))VSB > D(hA , rA
(hA ))VSA or

equivalently

VSB
VSA

>

∗ (h ))
D(hA ,rA
A
.
∗
D(hB ,rB (hB ))

Imposing (2) (and expressing

VSB
VSA

= αS and

VT B
VT A

= αT ), it follows that

along this locus πSA > πSB if and only if
αS > αT +
Consider

∂D(h,r)
∂r

∗
∗
(hB )]
(hA ) − rB
CT [rA
.
∗
VT A D(hB , rB (hB ))

(3)

∗
∗
= 0, in which case rA
(h) = rB
(h) = 0 for all h ≥ 0. Thus, (3) reduces to αS > αT .

This implies that on this locus upon which T is indifferent regarding his choice of target, S prefers to
have an attack staged on A over B if and only if αS > αT . That is, for (hA , hB ) ∈ (0, h̄A ) × (0, h̄B ),
S would: choose (hA , hB ) for which A will be attacked, if and only if the state’s relative valuation for
B is greater than the terrorist’s relative valuation for B (i.e., αS > αT ); and choose (hA , hB ) for which
B will be attacked, if and only if the state’s relative valuation for B is less than the terrorist’s relative
valuation for B (i.e., αS < αT ). Since αS ≤ 1 by assumption, it follows that whenever αT > 1 (i.e.,
VT B > VT A ), S would never choose security levels for which A is ultimately attacked. If instead αT < 1
(i.e., VT B < VT A ), then choosing (hA , hB ) along the locus, S may prefer to have the attack staged on A
(if αS > αT ) or may prefer to have the attack staged on B (if αS < αT ).26
26

If instead

∂D(h,r)
∂r

> 0, then the final term in (3) will generally not equal zero, in which case the identification of

the preferred target of S along the locus is not determined by a simple comparison of αS and αT . For example, it is
straightforward to show that for D(h, r) =

r
r+h

the condition corresponding to (3) is αS >

points along the locus S prefers an attack to be staged on A over B if and only if αS >
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√

αT .

√

αT , so that in this case for

To see why the preference of S regarding the target choice by T along the locus reduces to a simple
comparison of αS to αT when

∂D(h,r)
∂r

= 0, recall that what we are trying to determine is whether S

prefers an attack to be staged on A or B, focusing on combinations of (hA , hB ) for which T is indifferent
regarding his choice of target. Since S must always incur the security costs at each target, the comparison
of πSA to πSB at any (hA , hB ) reduces to a comparison of the expected loss from an attack staged at each
site (i.e., a comparison of VSA D(hA , rA ) to VSB D(hB , rB )). When

∂D(h,r)
∂r

= 0, ri∗ = 0 (for which

CT ri∗ = 0) at each target. Since T incurs identical costs of simply FT from attacking A or B, the
comparison of πT A to πT B reduces to a comparison of the expected gain from an attack staged at each
site (i.e., a comparison of VT A D(hA , rA ) to VT B D(hB , rB )). It follows that the relevant comparison
reduces to a comparison of αS to αT . If instead

∂D(h,r)
∂r

∗
∗
, so that the
need not equal CT rB
6= 0, then CT rA

comparison of πT A to πT B no longer reduces to a comparison of VT A D(hA , rA ) to VT B D(hB , rB ) (but
rather reduces to a comparison based upon the condition specified by (2)).
Returning to the choice of hA , recognize that at the point at which hA is increased to h̄A (along
with hB increased to h̄B ), πS is characterized by a discrete increase in value to πShigh = −[h̄A + h̄B ]CS .
This change in πS is certain to be an increase, since as hA and hB are increased from hA = h̄A − ε
and hB = hLB (h̄A − ε) to hA = h̄A and hB = hLB (h̄A ) = h̄B security costs increase by only a small,
continuous amount, while the expected damage from an attack decreases from a strictly positive level
down to zero.
In practice, (h∗A , h∗B ) can be identified by comparing πSlow , πSmid , and πShigh . It is possible for the
optimal choice of S to be characterized by h∗A < hLA (0), h∗A ∈ [hLA (0), h̄A ), or h∗A = h̄A . Further, for
h∗A ∈ [hLA (0), h̄A ) the equilibrium could involve an attack on A or an attack on B. The potential for
these different outcomes to arise can be illustrated by considering some examples with D(h, r) =

1
1+h

T
(for which the locus in Figure 1 is defined by hLA (hB ) = α1T (1 + hB ) − 1, implying hLA (0) = 1−α
and
αT


VT B −FT
4
T
(h̄A , h̄B ) = VT AF−F
,
). In each example, assume VSA = 1, VSB = 45 , CS = 25
, and VT A = 1.
FT
T

Example 1: VSA = 1, VSB = 54 , CS =

4
,
25

VT A = 1, VT B = 14 , and FT = 15 . It can be shown that
18

h∗A = hlow
A =

3
2

√
and h∗B = 0, resulting in an attack on A and πS∗ = πSlow = −2 CS VSA + CS =

−16
.
25

As

this example illustrates, S may want to leave a target completely undefended.
Example 2: VSA = 1, VSB = 54 , CS =

4
,
25

VT A = 1, VT B =

9
,
16

and FT = 15 . Example 2 differs

< 45 = αS , so that along the locus in Figure
q
VSA
1, S prefers A to be attacked. It can be shown that h∗A =
− 1 = 1 and h∗B = hLB (h∗A ) =
(1+αT )CS
from Example 1 in that VT B is larger. In this case, αT =

9
16

p
(1 + h∗A )αT − 1 = 18 , resulting in an attack on A and πS∗ = −2 (1 + αT )CS VSA + 2CS =
Example 3: VSA = 1, VSB = 45 , CS =

4
,
25

9
,
11

VT A = 1, VT B =

Example 2 in that VT B is even larger. In this case, αT =

9
11

1, S prefers B to be attacked. It can be shown that h∗A =

>
q

4
5

−17
.
25

and FT = 15 . Example 3 differs from

= αS , so that along the locus in Figure

VSB
(1+αT )αT CS

−1 =

5
6

and h∗B = hLB (h∗A ) =

q
(1 + h∗A )αT − 1 = 21 , resulting in an attack on B and πS∗ = −2 (1 + αT ) α1T CS VSB + 2CS =

−56
.
75

This

example illustrates how S may prefer to induce an attack on B as opposed to A.
Example 4: VSA = 1, VSB = 54 , CS =

4
,
25

VT A = 1, VT B =

9
,
11

and FT =

4
.
11

Example 4 differs from

Example 3 in that FT is larger. When the fixed cost for staging an attack is equal to this larger value,
h∗A = h̄A =

VT A −FT
FT

=

7
4

and h∗B = h̄B =

VT B −FT
FT

= 47 , for which no attack is staged and πS∗ =

−12
.
25

Thus, it clearly may be best for S to choose security levels sufficiently high so that no attack is staged.

4. Further Insights for Situations of Incomplete Information
Recall, under incomplete information S chooses (hA , hB ) to maximize his expected payoff by integrating
over all possible types of T (according to GT (vT A , vT B )), anticipating the subsequent behavior of T (for
the chosen (hA , hB ) and realized (VT A , VT B )).
When

∂D(h,r)
∂r

> 0 the optimal scope of T must satisfy

∂D(hi ,ri )
VT i
∂ri

= CT . Assuming

will choose a larger ri when VT i is larger, leading to a larger D(hi , ri ). Thus, when

∂ 2 D(h,r)
∂r2

∂D(h,r)
∂r

< 0, T

> 0, the type

of T impacts the payoff of S by not only influencing the target choice but by also altering D(hi , ri ). If
instead

∂D(h,r)
∂r

= 0, then T essentially chooses only where to attack so that the realization of (VT A , VT B )

impacts the payoff of S only by altering where the attack is staged and not by altering D(hi , ri ). Thus, for
19

∂D(h,r)
∂r

= 0 the expected payoff of S is πS = −VSA D(hA , 0)PA (hA , hB ) − VSB D(hB , 0)PB (hA , hB ) −

[hA + hB ] CS , with the values of PA (hA , hB ) and PB (hA , hB ) determined by integrating over the relevant regions illustrated in Figure 2 according to GT (vT A , vT B ). Therefore, for analytical convenience
we assume D(h, r) =

1
,
1+h

for which we further have (with respect to the boundaries in Figure 2):

B
V̄T A (hA ) = (1 + hA )FT , V̄T B (hB ) = (1 + hB )FT , and VTLB (VT A , hA , hB ) = 1+h
V .
1+hA T A

2
Further assume: VT A is determined by a draw from GT A (v) = UTv A (with 0 < UT A < ∞);

and αT (and thus VT B = αT VT A ) is determined independently of VT A by a draw from GT α (x) =

x
α̂

(with α̂ > 1). The parameter α̂ is the upper bound on the possible realizations of αT . By focusing on
α̂ > 1, we are allowing both VT A > VT B and VT B ≥ VT A to occur with positive probability (since, in
Proposition 1, we already obtained preliminary insights when S knew for certain which target was more
highly valued by T ). It follows that the set VT is a triangle with corners in (VT A , VT B )-space at (0, 0),
(UT A , 0), and (UT A , α̂UT A ), and each (VT A , VT B ) ∈ VT is equally likely.27 These assumptions greatly
ease the determination of PA (hA , hB ) and PB (hA , hB ), since each probability is simply equal to the ratio
of the intersection of the relevant area in Figure 2 with VT to the entire area of the triangle representing
VT .

A choice of hA = hB = 0 leads to V̄T A (0), V̄T B (0) = (FT , FT ), a point which lies within VT . Further, S would never choose hA >

UT A −FT
FT

, since hA =

UT A −FT
FT

makes the payoff of T from attacking A
i
h
UT A −FT
, S would never choose hB >
negative for all possible VT A . Similarly, for any chosen hA ∈ 0, FT
α̂hA + α̂ − 1 (since hB = α̂hA + α̂ − 1 guarantees that B is never attacked). Thus, the chosen (hA , hB )

2

(1+hA )(1+hB )
1+hB
FT
must lead to V̄T A (hA ), V̄T B (hB ) ∈ VT . As a result, PA (hA , hB ) = (1+h
−
and
α̂
UT A
A )α̂

2
  FT 2
(1+hA )(1+hB )
1+hB
FT
1+hB 2
PB (hA , hB ) = 1 − (1+h
−
+
.
α̂
UT A
α̂
UT A
A )α̂
Even when we restrict attention to
27

∂D(h,r)
∂r

= 0 and make convenient assumptions on GT (vT A , vT B ),

Note, we are assuming VT A is the larger of two independent draws of a random variable distributed U [0, UT A ] and α is a

single draw of a random variable distributed U [0, α̂]. Thus, if α̂ = 1 we have the special case in which VT A is the larger and
VT B is the smaller of two independent draws from a U [0, UT A ] distribution.
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the expression for πS is still quite complex and a general analysis of the choice of (hA , hB ) by S is
intractable. However, for fixed parameter values, h∗A and h∗B can be determined numerically. Fixing
VSA = 1, VSB = 45 , CS =

4
,
25

UT A = 1, and FT = 15 , such numerical results were obtained for various

α̂ (the results are reported in Table 2). Parameter values were intentionally chosen with the aim of
illustrating the wide range of qualitatively different outcomes that can arise.
The first column in Table 2 lists each α̂ considered, from smallest to largest. Reading down each
remaining column reveals how the value of the corresponding endogenous variable depends upon α̂.
Since a larger α̂ implies that T is more likely to place a relatively higher value on B, the results provide
insight on how the equilibrium depends upon the distribution from which the type of T is drawn.
The columns labeled h∗A and h∗B report equilibrium levels of security. As α̂ increases, h∗A decreases
and h∗B increases. Further, for relatively small α̂, S chooses a higher level of security at the target which
he values more highly (i.e., h∗A > h∗B ), while for relatively large α̂, S instead chooses a lower level of
security at the target which he values more highly (i.e., h∗A < h∗B ).28 This observation reinforces the
degree to which the choice by S is driven by the target valuations of T .
∗
The next two columns report the corresponding values of DA
=

damage at each target if the target is attacked. Since Di∗ =

1
1+h∗i

1
1+h∗A

∗
and DB
=

1
,
1+h∗B

the expected

is decreasing in h∗i , it directly follows

∗
∗
∗
∗
is decreasing in α̂; DA
< DB
for relatively
is increasing in α̂; DB
from the reported h∗A and h∗B that: DA
∗
∗
small values of α̂; and DA
> DB
for relatively large values of α̂.

The next three columns report the equilibrium probabilities that T stages an attack on A, stages an
attack on B, and attacks neither target. As α̂ increases, we have the intuitive results that: PA∗ decreases;
PB∗ increases; and P ∗ decreases. Further, for relatively small α̂, we have PA∗ > PB∗ .29 That is, it may be
best for S to choose security levels for which an attack is more likely to be staged on the target that S
values more highly. This observation is anticipated, since it was already noted that in an environment of
28

Additional calculations suggest that for the chosen parameter values h∗A > h∗B for α̂ ≤ 2.7630.

29

Additional calculations suggest that for the chosen parameter values PA∗ > PB∗ for α̂ ≤ 1.5690.

21

complete information it may be best for S to choose security levels for which A is certain to be attacked.
Returning to the columns labeled h∗A and h∗B , it may be best for S to leave a target completely
undefended. However, when S does so under incomplete information, he is leaving a target undefended
even though it is attacked with positive probability. For example, for α̂ = 20, h∗A = 0 even though
PA∗ = .0941 > 0.30 For such large α̂, T is almost certain to place such a larger value on B than on A,
that even a completely undefended Target A will rarely be attacked, to the point where it is best for S to
allocate no defensive resources to this target that he values more highly.31
The final two columns in Table 2 report Pi∗ Di∗ , equilibrium values of the expected damage at each
target (i.e., the probability that a target is attacked multiplied by the expected damage to the target when
∗
∗
appears to typically
appears to decrease and PB∗ DB
the target is attacked). From these results, PA∗ DA
∗
∗
may arise (see the first two rows of results). That is,
> PB∗ DB
increase as α̂ increases.32 Finally, PA∗ DA

it may be best for S to choose security levels for which the equilibrium expected damage is greater at the
target which S values more highly.33 Again, a parallel can be drawn to the case of complete information
where the expected damage is greater at A whenever S chooses security levels for which A is attacked.
As illustrated above, a general analysis of the choice of (hA , hB ) in an environment of incomplete
information is intractable. However, insights on S’s choice and the resulting equilibrium were obtained
by a numerical analysis. The equilibrium could qualitatively differ in several dimensions, in that: either h∗A > h∗B or h∗A < h∗B is possible (which, with

∂D(h,r)
∂r

∗
∗
= 0, directly implies either DA
< DB
or

∗
∗
DA
> DB
is possible); either PA∗ > PB∗ or PA∗ < PB∗ is possible; h∗A = 0 even though PA∗ > 0 may
∗
∗
∗
∗
be best; h∗B = 0 even though PB∗ > 0 may be best; and either PA∗ DA
> PB∗ DB
or PA∗ DA
< PB∗ DB
is

possible.
30

Additional calculations suggest that for the chosen parameter values h∗A = 0 for α̂ ≥ 19.6611.

31

While not reported in Table 2, h∗B = 0 could also be best. If instead VSB =

1
3

(along with VSA = 1, CS =

4
25 ,

UT A = 1,

and FT = 15 ), then h∗B = 0 (even though PB∗ > 0) for α̂ ≤ 1.6269.
32

∗
More precisely, PB∗ DB
appears to increase in α̂ until the point at which h∗A = 0, beyond which further increases in α̂

∗
appear to result in a decrease in PB∗ DB
.
33

∗
∗
Additional calculations suggest that for the chosen parameter values PA∗ DA
> PB∗ DB
for α̂ ≤ 1.2968.
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5. Conclusion
A single period interaction between a state (S) and a terrorist organization (T ) was analyzed, in
which S initially chose security levels at two sites and T subsequently chose the target (and potentially
scope) of attack. Increasing security at a site is costly for S, but has the potential benefits of decreasing
the expected damage if the site is attacked and decreasing the probability with which the site is attacked.
However, there is an undesired side effect of this second benefit: increasing security at one target may
increase the probability that an alternative target is attacked. Thus, a single decisionmaker allocating
resources across multiple targets must carefully account for such cross target effects.
If S knows which site is more highly valued by T , then S allocates more security to this site (even if
this is not the site that S values more highly). Under complete information, S can correctly infer which
target T will attack. A closer examination under complete information revealed the strong degree to
which the preference by S over which site is attacked depends on the relative valuation of each player
for each target: when the expected damage from an attack does not depend upon the scope of the attack
(so that T is effectively choosing only where to attack), then S will set security levels for which T prefers
to attack Target A (the target that S values more highly) over Target B if and only if the state’s relative
valuation for Target B is greater than the terrorist’s relative valuation for Target B (i.e., if and only if
αS > αT ). Further, it was shown how S may want to leave one of the targets completely undefended
and how S may want to choose security levels sufficiently high so that no attack is staged.
A setting of incomplete information was subsequently analyzed in greater detail. A numerical analysis revealed that in equilibrium it may be best: for S to leave a target completely undefended (even if it
is attacked with positive probability); for S to choose security levels for which an attack is more likely
to be staged on the target that he values more highly; or for S to choose security levels for which the
expected damage from a terrorist attack is greater at the target that he values more highly.
As an avenue for further research, our model does not allow for the terrorists’ valuation of alternative
23

targets to be affected by the government’s allocation of defensive resources (on this point see also Bier,
Oliveros, and Samuelson, 2007, p. 585). Terrorists may possibly value not only damaging a target
but also destroying defensive resources at a target. One possible extension of our model would involve
intertemporal optimization on the part of both the terrorists and the state, in which the choices in the
current period influence target values in the future.
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Table 1: Summary of Notations.
Variable/Expression
T
S
A
B
VSi
VT i
VT
GT (vT A , vT B )
hi
ri
D(h, r)
CS
FT
CT
πSi (hA , hB , ri )
πS∅ (hA , hB )
πT i (hi , ri )
πT ∅
ri∗ (hi )
πT∗ i (hi )
αT
αS
h̄i
V̄T i (hi )
Pi (hA , hB )
P∅ (hA , hB )
πS
h∗i
ri∗
Pi∗
P∅
Di∗
UT A
α̂
GT A (v)
GT α (x)

Meaning
Terrorist Organization
Target State
Target of greater value to S
Target of lesser value to S
Value that S places on Target i, for i ∈ A, B
Value that T places on Target i, for i ∈ A, B
Set of possible values for (VT A , VT B )
Joint distribution function from which (VT A , VT B ) is determined
Homeland security resources allocated by S to Target i, for i ∈ A, B
Resources allocated by T to attacking Target i (i.e., the scope of attack on Target i), for i ∈ A, B
Expected damage from an attack of scope r on a target defended with security resources of h
Marginal cost to S of increasing homeland security
Fixed costs to T of staging an attack
Marginal cost to T of increasing scope of attack
Payoff to S if Target i is attacked, for i ∈ A, B
Payoff to S if neither target is attacked
Payoff to T from attacking Target i, for i ∈ A, B
Payoff to T from staging no attack
Optimal scope of attack on Target i defended with hi , for i ∈ A, B
Payoff to T from staging an attack on Target i of the optimal scope ri∗ (hi ), for i ∈ A, B
)
Relative valuation of T for Target B (defined as VVTT B
A
Relative valuation of S for Target B (defined as VVSB
)
SA
Level of homeland security at Target i above which an attack is never staged on the target, for i ∈ A, B
Valuation of T for Target i below which an attack is not staged on the target, for i ∈ A, B
Probability with which Target i is attacked for chosen (hA , hB ), for i ∈ A, B
Probability that no attack is staged for chosen (hA , hB )
Expected payoff to S for chosen (hA , hB ), accounting for GT (vT A , vT B ) and subsequent behavior of T
Optimal level of homeland security at Target i (i.e., level which maximizes πS ), for i ∈ A, B
Equilibrium scope of attack if Target i is attacked, for i ∈ A, B
Equilibrium probability with which Target i is attacked, for i ∈ A, B
Equilibrium probability that no attack is staged
Equilibrium expected damage from an attack on Target i (if the target is attacked), for i ∈ A, B
Upper bound on VT A (within Section 4)
Upper bound on αT (within Section 4)
Distribution function from which VT A is determined (within Section 4)
Distribution function from which αT is determined (within Section 4)

Table 2: Numerical Results, with VSA = 1, VSB = 54 , CS =
α̂
1
1.25
1.5
1.75
2
2.5
3
4
5
10
15
20
25

h∗A
1.1244
1.0431
.9697
.9051
.8483
.7530
.6760
.5572
.4684
.2142
.0817
0
0

h∗B
.4634
.5336
.5827
.6195
.6486
.6925
.7249
.7709
.8032
.8892
.9315
.9608
1.0078

∗
DA
.4707
.4895
.5077
.5249
.5410
.5704
.5967
.6422
.6810
.8236
.9244
1
1

∗
DB
.6834
.6520
.6318
.6175
.6066
.5908
.5798
.5647
.5546
.5293
.5177
.5100
.4981

PA∗
.5645
.5002
.4525
.4152
.3850
.3387
.3045
.2567
.2244
.1464
.1135
.0941
.0771

PB∗
.2725
.3594
.4257
.4780
.5203
.5847
.6316
.6960
.7384
.8367
.8761
.8984
.9167

P∅∗
.1630
.1403
.1217
.1068
.0947
.0766
.0639
.0473
.0372
.0169
.0105
.0075
.0062

4
25 ,

UT A = 1, and FT = 15 .

∗
(PA∗ )(DA
)
.2657
.2448
.2297
.2180
.2083
.1932
.1817
.1649
.1528
.1206
.1049
.0941
.0771

∗
(PB∗ )(DB
)
.1862
.2344
.2690
.2952
.3156
.3455
.3662
.3930
.4095
.4429
.4536
.4582
.4566
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